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1 The role of law in the United States
Understanding US law is impossible without first understanding the role
law plays both in its political system and in the consciousness of its citizens.
Law is ubiquitous in general culture: literature, cinema, television (Raynaud
and Zoller, 2001). On first impression, its status appears paradoxical. On
the one hand, there is an almost mystical faith in the power of law to tran-
scend all conflicts: the rule of law (as opposed to the rule of men) was the
American formula for a just society, in opposition to the absolutist
European government of the time. The US Constitution was the founding
document for the nation, and law has ever since had a defining character for
the country and its self-perception as a beacon of democracy and individ-
ual freedom. While there are struggles within the law, the rule of law and
the Constitution themselves seem beyond discussion: they provide an
almost unquestioned framework for debates (Levinson, 1988). On the other
hand, and for similar reasons, the distinction between law and politics is
much less clear than in European countries. It is acknowledged – sometimes
cynically, sometimes approvingly – that law incorporates and serves the
political ends of those who shape it. The traditional American distrust of
government encompasses distrust of any claims of neutral, objective,
natural law. Public reactions to the US Supreme Court decision in Bush v.
Gore (2000) demonstrate both these aspects. When a majority of five
Republican-appointed Justices held for Republican presidential candidate
Bush, and four less conservative Justices held against him, there were wide-
spread complaints about the politicized judiciary, and the court’s split along
partisan lines. Yet hardly anybody seriously questioned the binding nature
of the decision, which in eﬀect determined the presidency.
The political character of law also explains why law, and in particular lit-
igation, is often seen as a tool for proactive social change, not just for the
retrospective resolution of individual disputes. Supreme Court decisions
like Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which abolished school segrega-
tion and implemented civil rights, and Roe v. Wade (1973), which estab-
lished a constitutional right to abortion, were not only mileposts in legal
development, they are also part of the country’s cultural identity, familiar
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to every schoolchild. The reason is that public regulation was relatively
weak for a long time; as a consequence the task of enforcing standards of
conduct was left to private parties who would act as private attorneys
general. This is true for areas as diverse as antitrust, civil rights, environ-
mental regulation, products safety standards and many others. There are
one million lawyers in a country of roughly 300 million inhabitants not
only because Americans are more litigious than others, but also because lit-
igation serves broader purposes than elsewhere.
A good example for regulation by private litigation is the law of damages
for accidents. Compensatory damages for tort victims are often substan-
tially higher than elsewhere; in addition plaintiﬀs can often claim ‘punitive’
damages over and above their actual injury, meant to deter and punish
defendants. What looks to foreigners like an undue mixture of private and
criminal law and an inappropriate enrichment for plaintiﬀs must be under-
stood with regard to three functions. First, the function of tort law, and
especially of punitive damages, is as much regulatory as compensatory.
Because damages are a cost of doing business, they must be high enough to
ensure that the regulated conduct becomes unattractive for defendants.
Giving these damages to plaintiﬀs is justified as an incentive for private
individuals to perform this ultimately public regulatory function. A second
reason for high damages under US law is often overlooked: US law usually
provides for one-time lump sum payments of damages, equitable remedies
like both specific performance and recurring payments are only exception-
ally granted, because courts are unwilling to oversee complicated enforce-
ments. Hence a one-time sum must not only cover attorneys’ fees but also
all future costs to the victim. These costs can be substantial, because the
social security and healthcare systems in the US are much weaker; costs of
accidents, which are borne, in European countries, by the state, must here
be provided through damages. This leads to a third and last point. In the
United States, accidents are seldom seen as a matter of fate that must be
borne either by the victim or by society at large; rather, injuries can and
should be compensated by the responsible person or corporation, provided
that defendant is rich enough (‘deep pocket theory’). Private law and liti-
gation thus perform functions of regulation and of redistribution, which
are performed, in other countries, by public law.
While small claims can often not be brought because litigation is expen-
sive and legal aid restricted, big private suits are attractive, to plaintiﬀs and
their lawyers, for several reasons. Under a system of contingency fees, a
plaintiﬀ need not pay her attorney unless she wins (winning fees can be con-
siderable, and must be paid from the award). Class actions enable multiple
plaintiﬀs with similar grievances to pool their claims and bring suit
together. Far-reaching discovery enables plaintiﬀs to substantiate their
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claims. Juries decide even in private law. In recent years, though, regulation
through litigation has come under attack; it remains to be seen whether this
development changes the role of law, and lawyers. Litigation (and lawyers)
are often criticized; litigation is often avoided through arbitration and alter-
native dispute regulation.
It is therefore inaccurate to say, as many do, that US law prioritizes the
individual over community more than other systems. Indeed, there is on the
one hand a strong emphasis on rights, especially civil rights (Glendon,
1991). Individuals bear the burden to defend their interests because the
state will not do this for them. Criminal defendants, e.g., will be sentenced,
sometimes to death, because they neglect to pursue procedural rights. On
the other hand, these individual rights and responsibilities are enforced
largely because they serve as incentives for welfare-maximing conduct; they
exist for the benefit of the community. It would me more accurate to say
that US law prioritizes overall social welfare over equality.
2 Characteristics of US law
2.1 Sources of law
Law schools are professional schools. Students attend them after graduat-
ing from college, and learn how to argue as attorneys. This is crucial in
shaping US lawyers’ understanding of their own legal system’s identity.
Students are taught the law as a line of cases, and as a forum for constant
struggles between arguments and counterarguments rather than as a sub-
stantive whole (except for bar exams). Statutory interpretation is often only
taught in the course of cases. This is why the US legal system is perceived,
by insiders and outsiders alike, as a system mostly shaped by case law: not
a fully accurate picture.
The most important and distinctive legal source in US law is the US
Constitution of 1787. It is brief and incomplete, often unclear, and anti-
quated (Dahl, 2002): It has only seen 27 amendments since its drafting, ten
of which – the Bill of Rights – by 1791. Despite, or perhaps because of, all
this, the US Constitution is still the founding document of national and
legal identity to the same degree as the French Civil Code in France, a tes-
tament to the respective importance of public and constitutional law in the
United States, compared to that of private law in Continental Europe. The
Constitution is comparable to the Code in another sense: it provides a supe-
rior normative framework for legal development.
Large areas of US law are still based on case law, developed by the courts
through the system of precedent. Courts, in deciding a case, will look at pre-
viously decided cases as authority and guidance. The binding force of
precedent (‘stare decisis’) is not absolute: courts are not strictly bound by
their own earlier decisions, and they are more willing than their English
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counterparts to develop the law in accordance with social reality, a reflec-
tion of the higher relevance of extralegal considerations for the law
(Llewellyn, 1960).
At the same time, however, the number and importance of statutes in the
United States is, in all likelihood, rather higher than lower compared to
civil law countries, the density of regulation in some is considerable and the
readiness of US courts to deviate from a statute’s meaning is lower than in
Europe (Calabresi, 1982). Contrary to the perception of both insiders and
outsiders, the role of legislation vis-à-vis the judiciary is comparable to that
in Europe.
The important diﬀerence is the relative lack of codification. US law has
never been codified to the same degree as European legal systems (Herman,
1995/1996; Weiss, 2000). Proposals to codify the private law of individual
states in the 19th century either failed (e.g. in New York) or became irrele-
vant (e.g. in California, where the code was soon ignored by the judiciary).
Louisiana is an exception; it has a civil code that is applied. A codification
was not necessary as a national or even a state symbol (the constitutions
played this role), and a general American distrust in government meant that,
unlike the situation in France, democratic values were expected more from
judges, less from parliament. However, the lack of a codification should not
be overestimated in its importance. First, several areas of the law are codi-
fied, especially on the state level; this is true e.g. for civil and criminal proce-
dure. Often they are modelled on national model codes, the most prominent
example being the Uniform Commercial Code which codifies (and unifies)
wide areas of commercial law. Second, the American Law Institute has,
since the beginning of the 20th century, compiled ‘Restatements of the Law’
with the goal of restating, ordering and (to some extent) unifying the law.
These Restatements, though not binding, are often cited in court decisions
and fulfil, partly, the systematizing function fulfilled by codes in Europe.
Finally, much common law doctrine has become so refined by now that large
areas of the law are as clear and systematic as in codified systems.
2.2 Federal system and plurality of law
In an important sense there is not one US American law but many: the laws
of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories, plus federal
law. The individual states not only have their own legislatures and execu-
tives, as in other federal systems; they also have their own judiciaries. There
are therefore two parallel strands of judiciaries from first instance courts to
Supreme Courts: state courts and federal courts. The scope of federal law
is limited: Congress has only limited competence to legislate and, since the
1990s, the Supreme Court has enforced these limitations more strictly.
Furthermore, federal courts are restricted in their ability to generate federal
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common law (Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 1938). Similarly limited is the
jurisdiction of federal courts: They have exclusive subject-matter jurisdic-
tion only in some areas, especially admiralty law and federal antitrust law.
Their jurisdiction is concurrent with that of state courts in two important
areas: most federal law questions – matters of federal law – and diversity
jurisdiction, when plaintiﬀ and defendant come from diﬀerent states (to
avoid bias of state courts). Otherwise, jurisdiction lies exclusively with state
courts. The federal system is built on an idea of competition, rather than
coordination, as in European systems (Halberstam, 2004).
This plurality of laws is otherwise not unlike the one in the European
Union, where EU law has a limited scope, and competences remain largely
with the member states. But there is an important diﬀerence: the diﬀerent
laws in the United States, including Louisiana, share the same methodol-
ogy and inductive legal style, while there are often significant diﬀerences in
substance. In fact, federalism is often praised as providing a laboratory for
policy experiments. The states are seen to be in regulatory competition,
most notably in areas like environmental law, but also in corporate law. In
Europe, on the other hand, comparative law has recently revealed remark-
able similarities in substance (especially, but not only, in private law) as a
consequence of a less instrumental understanding of law, while diﬀerences
in style and methodology between legal systems are still significant.
2.3 Legal actors
The US Constitution adopted Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of
powers, and distinguishes among executive, legislative and judicial func-
tions. Yet, while in Montesquieu’s conception diﬀerent institutions perform
the neatly separated executive, legislative and judicial functions, the US
Constitution, fuelled by mistrust in government, establishes an elaborate
system of checks and balances of institutions upon each other, under which
no single institution should be able to have too much power, and compro-
mises are necessary. This is true between the branches of government, but
also within each of them. Thus the most important executive position in
the federal government is held by the President, yet numerous administra-
tive agencies perform executive functions often in considerable autonomy.
The legislative function is allocated to the Congress, which consists of two
chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is
made up of two senators from each state, no matter how big or small, while
the House represents voters from each constituency more or less equally.
However, so-called gerrymandering, creative redistricting typically imple-
mented by the majority distorts results to a degree unknown in Europe.
Finally, the judiciary consists, on the federal level, of judges appointed by
the President for life, and allocated to three levels of courts: district courts,
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courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. While the state constitutions
diﬀer, sometimes considerably, from the US Constitution (which some of
them predate), the same approach can generally be found there; judges,
however, are often elected by the public.
The system of checks and balances has two important consequences.
First, the government speaks with many voices, which makes it weaker than
the sum of its powers should suggest. Second, law, especially public law, is
not a rational system of substantive rules, but more a procedure for a con-
stant power struggle (or the outcome of such struggles), not only between
the federal government and the states, but also within each of these systems.
This has spurred an emphasis on process instead of substance. Government
is restrained by procedure and by the system of checks and balances, not
so much by substantive constitutional law.
2.4 Legal style
Legal style and legal method in the United States are diﬀerent from those
in other countries, even common law countries (Atiyah & Summers, 1991).
On the one hand, especially in statutory and constitutional interpretation,
there is still a remarkable degree of textualism and formalism reminiscent
of European law in the 19th century. There are two reasons. First, the judge
is not supposed to implement the will of the legislator (although, somewhat
paradoxically, many oppose the use of legislative materials). This resembles
the otherwise rejected concept of the judge as ‘mouth of the law’. Second,
legislation often represents a compromise as the result of hard bargaining,
judges should not second-guess such a compromise to reach seemingly
more rational results. This judicial restraint may also explain why propor-
tionality tests are relatively unpopular, not only in criminal law, where pun-
ishment is often unusually harsh, but also in other areas, where balancing
is considered inappropriate for judges. On the other hand in case law, US
law and legal thought have, perhaps more radically than most other legal
systems, rejected a formalism that was still en vogue in the 19th century, and
have supplemented it with open policy considerations to an extent
unknown in most European legal systems. Law is not usually understood
as a coherent and systematic whole, but rather as a hodgepodge of court
decisions and statutes; therefore systematic arguments carry little weight,
and legal reasoning is both more case-specific and more inductive than in
Continental European systems. Americans doubt that there is ‘one right
answer’ to every case that can somehow be distilled from the legal system
as a whole: court decisions are the result of the better argument made by
the winning party, not by logical deductions from a coherent system of law.
A consequence of the political substance of the law, and of the fact that
law is the fruit of political determination rather than of systematic and
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neutral goals, is that law often embodies either extreme positions or ad hoc
compromises. For example, positions on abortion (both by individuals and
by lawmakers) have always been either ‘pro choice’ or ‘pro life’; compro-
mises seem harder to achieve than in other countries (Glendon, 1987).
Homosexuality sees similar extremes: in the same year (2003), Texas still
criminalized homosexual conduct (overturned by the US Supreme Court
in Lawrence v. Texas), while in Massachusetts homosexuals attained the
right to marry, because anything short of that would have been a violation
of equal protection rights. The middle ground of registered partnerships
seems unattractive to both sides in the debate. While such oscillation
between extremes may look unattractive in the short run, the upside is that
US law has traditionally been more open to change and reform than either
English common law or continental European law. Bad laws may be fre-
quent, but a process of trial and error keeps their detrimental eﬀects to a
minimum, and the US is quicker than others to change its law.
2.5 Legal thought
US legal thought in the 19th century (often called ‘classical legal thought’),
was traditionally formalist and conceptualist, comparable to, and influ-
enced by, legal thought in Europe, especially Germany (Hoeflich, 1997). In
the beginning of the 20th century, formalism was rejected by legal realism,
a development which in turn was influenced by developments in Europe:
German ‘Freirechtsschule’ (Herget & Wallace, 1987), French social theory
of law, but in more radical fashion. Legal realism rejected formalism with
its emphasis on logical deductions, on two grounds. First, formalism was
inconclusive: legal concepts do not have inherent meanings and thus do not
yield definitive outcomes to solve cases and problems. Second, the auton-
omy of law as a discipline was questioned on normative and empirical
grounds. Law was influenced by and in turn had influence on real world
issues, and therefore was and should be influenced by insights about the real
world. Politically, legal realism often came with a progressive social agenda
and was instrumental for the New Deal and social legislation.
Legal Realism spurred an array of schools of legal thought, mostly inter-
disciplinary in nature (Duxbury, 1995). The most influential of these has
been Law and Economics, which can now be considered mainstream and
often serves as a kind of substitute for the lack of legal doctrine. A politi-
cally radical oﬀspring from legal realism was Critical Legal Studies, a
loosely connected movement that combined the antiformalism of legal
realism with leftist political ideas (often drawing on Marxism or the
Frankfurt Critical School) and modern/postmodern philosophical methods
(Joerges & Trubek, 1989). Critical Legal Studies spurred other movements,
including Critical Race Theory, Law and Feminism, and several other
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politically progressive and/or methodologically postmodern groups. All in
all, the rejection of formalism and of doctrine means that an interdiscipli-
nary approach is almost required now in legal writing, although approaches
other than law and economics have rarely been influential on judges
(Zimmermann, 1995/1998).
3 US law and other legal systems
3.1 Influences of foreign law on US law
The United States received English (common) law, with the exception of
those parts not in accordance with the principles of the new Republic, in
particular Constitutional law, the division of barristers and solicitors, and
feudal elements of property law. English law remained influential after the
foundation of the nation; decisions of English courts are still, though more
rarely, cited as persuasive authority. But English law was not the only influ-
ence. The law in Louisiana is still based to a large (though sometimes over-
estimated) degree on French and Spanish (civil) law; private law is codified
(Palmer, 1999). Similarly, the law of Puerto Rico still has strong roots in
Spanish law. Moreover, the 19th century saw considerable influence from
German law (Pound, 1937). At the same time, continental philosophical
ideas, particularly from the French and Scottish Enlightenment, were
far more influential on the United States than on England. Its written
Constitution, and judicial review of legislation, represent a significant
diﬀerence from ‘purer’ common law systems. Thus the United States is
rather a mixed legal system ‘sui generis’ than a pure common law system
(von Mehren, 2000) and the quip about England and the US being ‘sepa-
rated by a common law’ is not inaccurate.
3.2 Influences of US law on foreign laws
In the 20th century, as the United States became simultaneously more self-
confident and more parochial, while Europe seemed far less attractive as a
model, US law developed in more isolation. European émigrés found that,
while they were often welcome, their legal traditions were not (Graham,
2002). Foreign influences are now often forgotten or played down in the
United States; Karl Llewellyn, e.g., had to conceal the German origins of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Since the two world wars, the desire to learn
from others has been outweighed by the desire to teach others, and US law
has in turn influenced many legal systems worldwide, a process not unlike
the reception of Roman law in Europe (Wiegand, 1991, 1996). The most
important influence was in constitutional reforms and drafting: constitu-
tionalism, judicial review, enforceable civil rights and a system of checks and
balances between the branches of government have been influential in
numerous countries. A second important area, moved by business and big
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law firms, has been commercial law: antitrust law, securities regulations,
accounting standards, corporate governance, bankruptcy and also con-
sumer protection and products liability law. There has been notably less
influence in criminal law (with the exception of criminal procedure, e.g. the
right of the accused to remain silent) and traditional areas of private law,
especially property law, family law and law of succession. Reception is rarely
pure. Often US institutions are adapted for their new local settings, influence
is more in rhetoric than in substance, and receiving countries pass laws with
no will or ability to enforce them (Archives de Philosophie du droit, 2001).
US law has also been extremely influential on commercial legal practice.
US law firms have long been big enough to ‘go global’ and open oﬃces all
around the world; US clients have been strong enough to influence the
day-to-day work of non-US attorneys. Many modern contract types
(leasing, franchising, barter) stem from the creativity of US lawyers. The
drafting style has become more American: long, detailed contract docu-
ments are more and more replacing the brief documents other legal cul-
tures were used to.
The reason for adopting US law is not always its (perceived) superiority.
Another important reason lies in economics (Dezalay & Garth, 2002): a US
interest, in part altruistic in part not, to bring other countries up to US stan-
dard, and the desire of developing countries to appease such pressure, a
process that has been described as hegemonic (Mattei, 2003). Adoption is
sometimes very successful, sometimes not at all. Often the lack of similar-
ities regarding culture and infrastructure of the United States means that
laws on the books were either ineﬀective (e.g. corporate governance reform
in Vietnam) or outright disastrous (reform of capital markets in Russia).
Lack of sensitivity on the side of American exporters, and desire to please
(the US government and foreign investors) on the side of receiving states
often contribute to unsuccessful legal transplants (Carrington, 2005).
3.3 US law and international law
The nation’s founders, inspired by a strong desire to be accepted by other
sovereign nations as an equal, gave international law the status of ‘supreme
law of the land’ (US Const. Art. VI, §2). Since then, the United States has
become stronger and, as a consequence, less eager to enter into international
treaties, and to be restrained. Americans trust their own institutions and
mistrust supranational institutions that take powers and competences away,
even (or in particular) if those institutions aim at enforcing essentially
similar values to those embodied by the US Constitution. This does not
merely represent disdain for, or ignorance of, international law. First, inter-
national law is considered federal law, and foreign politics is a domain for
the federal government. Consequently the states have little say in its creation
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and fear loss of competences; courts are prevented, by the separation of
powers, from using international law to overrule statutes. International law
is dealt with as a matter of constitutional law. Second, the United States has
always been eager to justify its actions in legal terms; it is trying to develop
(or revolutionize) rather than simply break or ignore international law. This
is congruent with the general US view of law as shaped by process in accor-
dance with societal needs rather than as a transcendent and depoliticized
natural law body.
3.4 Comparative law in the United States
In the beginning of the republic, US courts saw themselves in the
Continental European ius commune tradition and frequently cited
European, not just English, authors as well as Roman law sources (Hoeflich,
1997). Comparative law was relevant; the Second World Congress of
Comparative Law (the first after the Seminal Congress in Paris, 1900) took
place in 1904 in St. Louis (Clark, forthcoming). In the 20th century,
however, perhaps with growing self-confidence in US law, comparative law
became less fashionable in the United States. While there is much compari-
son between diﬀerent state laws, internationally comparative law was taught
at some universities only, originally mainly by European immigrants, later
by some US American pioneers to the field. Today, comparative law is con-
sidered of vital importance, no doubt owing to perceived demands posed by
globalization, and is taught at almost any law school. But it is considered a
field separate from general law classes, and frequently its content is a very
basic introduction to (often stereotypical) basic characteristics of various
legal systems (Bermann, 1999; Reimann, 2002).
Lack of interest in comparative law is not so much due to the (often exag-
gerated) parochialism of the United States in general. Rather, the main
reason lies in legal education. In particular the first year of law school
emphasizes ‘thinking like a lawyer’, which means thinking like a US lawyer.
This often suggests, albeit not deliberately, that thinking like a US lawyer
is a universal way of thinking, and that the results of this reasoning, like
the results of developments in case law, are somehow natural and optimal
results of any legal systems. As a consequence, foreign law is often seen with
a strong US bias, and diﬀerences from US law are easily seen as deficien-
cies. Only in recent years, and in large part through the influence of other
disciplines (anthropology, sociology, economics) has there been renewed
interest in foreign and comparative law on the one hand, methodology of
comparative law on the other. Unfortunately, theory and practice of com-
parative law do not always supplement each other. Paradoxically, while US
law may be the most important reference point for many comparative law
studies, US comparative law itself is still in development.
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